AFFIRMATIVE (RE)ACTION: ANYTHING
BUT RACE
KATEERYN K. RUSSELL*

In my first-year contracts course we were assigned Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co.' This was a 1965 District of Columbia Circuit
case involving contracts of adhesion. At issue was an installment
contract for furniture, which had a clause that allowed the seller to
demand payment in full at any time. If the buyer's payments were
delinquent, the seller had right of replevy.2 When Ora Williams, a
Black woman, fell in arrears on her payments, the furniture store sued
her. Despite the objectionable clause, the lower court upheld the
contract.3 As a first year law student, the court's reasoning was
startlingly illogical. As I would soon learn, over and again, there is a
4
difference between what is "legal" and what is "just." Ultimately, the

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia determined that
"unconscionability"-evidenced by gross inequality between parties-is
5
a basis for voiding a commercial contract and remanded the case.

* Assistant Professor, University of Maryland at College Park; Ph.D., 1992, University of
Maryland at College Park;J.D., 1986, University of California, Hastings College of Law; B.A., 1983,
University of Californiaat Berkeley. The author wishes to thankJamin Raskin, Associate Dean of
the American University, Washington College of Law, for the invitation to participate in this
Conference.
1. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(noting that Williams had charged $1800 worth of merchandise from 1957 to 1962, and made
$1400 worth of payments, yet Walker-Thomas sought to replevy allitems Williams had purchased
when she defaulted on $500 stereo).
3. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914,916 (D.C. 1964) (recognizing
that contract may have been "irresponsible," but finding that governing D.C. legislation
prevented court from providing relief).
4. See, eg., Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdeingthe Messenger The Discourseof FingerPointing
as the Laws Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 132 (1987) (arguing that Latin word
"lex," which is root for "legal" does not encompass abstract ethical dimensions of law which are
found in Latin word jus," which is root for "justice").
5. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 449-50. But see id. at 450 (DanaherJ., dissenting) (blaming
Williams for her legal predicament, noting that stereo is luxury item not properly purchased
with "relief funds").
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It was not until I had moved to the D.C. metropolitan area and
unexpectedly driven past the Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., that I
fully appreciated the extra-legal dimensions of the case. The store was
in a poor and run down section of northeast D.C.
The Walker-Thomas case came to mind when I received a letter from
Dean Jamin Raskin, inviting me to participate on a panel entitled,
"Creditor and Debtor Races: Is it Time to Get Beyond Race? Can We?
How?" Panelists were asked to ponderJustice Scalia's pronouncement
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: "Individuals who have been
wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but
under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or
debtor race."'
Justice Scalia's wholesale rejection of contractual
language to describe Black/White race relations is oddly telling. His
choice of words indicates his awareness that for many people, Blacks
in particular, the relationship between Blacks and Whites is a creditordebtor relationship-one involving "gross inequality" between the
parties.
Just as it was true for Ora Williams and similarly situated poor

people, Blacks in the United States have been forced to rely on the
courts as a forum of last resort for racial relief. In part, Blacks have
sought relief for being part of a relationship with terms "unreasonably
favorable"' to Whites. Affirmative action has been one form of relief.
Recent decisions by the Court, however, in particular the Adarand
decision, make it clear that race is being neutralized in state and
federal anti-discrimination law.' The Court's most recent attempts
at race neutralization have been in the areas of employment"0 and
voting rights.1"
Justice Scalia mistakenly equates the racial hatred that produced
U.S. chattel slavery with proactive measures taken to combat slavery's
6. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
7. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097,2118 (1995) (Scalia,J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
8. Id
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2475 (1995) (holding that voting districts
may not be gerrymandered on purely racial bases); Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2045-56
(1995) (remanding case with order that district court weaken its school desegregation orders
as Court determined that state was in compliance with Constitution); se, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816, 2823, 2828 (1993) (finding that though congressional policy, as manifested in Voting
Rights Act, prohibited dilution of minority voting strength, facially neutral state legislation that
provided minority voting districts must have some rational basis other than pure racial
separation to meet sufficient justification under Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause).
10. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (discussing differences in proof of "social" and
.economic" disadvantage and relating such differences to minorities' problems with meeting
necessary scrutiny).
11. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.

1996]

AFFIRMATIVE (RE)ACTION

continuing remains.12 Underlying his statement is the assumption
that the debt for slavery has been adequately redressed. Notably
absent from Scalia's commentary is any reference to how this debt has
been repaid. Is thirty years of affirmative action legislation sufficient
redress for almost ten times that many years of slavery, and one
hundred years of Jim Crow legislation?
I think most people in this country would like nothing more than
to "get beyond" race. Unfortunately, being tainted by this country's
racial prism is not a matter of individual choice. The Black versus
White racial schism is part of the core that defines the United
States."3 This schism qualifies as what sociologist Emile Durkheim
labeled a "social fact" 1 4 To alter this acute social reality, we must
first acknowledge it. Only then can we deal squarely with race.
Taking account of race is required "get beyond" race. 5 This brings
the discussion to the question at the core of the symposium panel-does race still matter? This Essay will explore how and why race
matters and how affirmative action and ultimately the Supreme Court
are implicated.
I.

MICROAGGRESSIONS, MACROAGGRESSIONS, DISCRIMINATION, AND

DENIAL

Professor Peggy Davis uses the term "microaggression" to describe
the daily, interpersonal, non-verbal racial slights that Blacks experience. 16 Examples of racial slights by Whites include the failure to
make eye contact with Blacks and other gestures which indicate

12. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia proclaimed: "To
pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign of
purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced
race slavery.... In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American." Id. at
2119.
13. One need look no further than the poll data on racial attitudes about the verdict in the
Cafornia v. Simpson case, No. BA 297211 (Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995). See,
e.g., Clarence Page, Dramatic Racial Divide Runs Deep After O.J. Verdict, GREENSBORO NEWS &
RECORD (N.C.), Oct. 12, 1995, at A11 (recognizing polls that showed from trial's beginning that
.most Whites thought Simpson was guilty and most Blacks thought he was innocent" but that
verdict brought forth most "dramatic divide"); Eric Zorn, Focus on: Simpson Verdict Fallout; Cruel

Honesty PromptsMany to Lash Back, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 14, 1995, atA19 (noting
that racial divergence in polls shows that "racial animosity runs deeper" than believed).
14. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 13 (1982). Durkheim defines
a "social fact" as "every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an
external constraint" or "every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while
at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations." Id.
15. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,407 (1978) (Blackmun,J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun commented, "[I]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race." Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring).
16. Peggy C. Davis, Law asMicroaggression,98YALE LJ. 1559, 1565 (1989) (discussing White
versus Black perceptions ofjudicial system).
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disrespect (e.g., failure to hold a door or elevator open, non-

acknowledgement of a greeting, physical distancing in public
spaces). 17

Microaggressions

co-exist

with

macroaggressions.

Macroaggressions have been defined as insults or pejorative statements and/or actions by Whites against Blacks. 18 Macroaggressions,
unlike microaggressions, are not directed at any particular Black

person. Nevertheless, they cause harm.
Two recent incidents provide examples of macroaggressions. The

Minnesota Educational Computing Corporation sells a computer
game entitled "Freedom!" Players begin the game as illiterate,
Southern Black slaves who seek to obtain the necessary skills to work
their way toward freedom.1 9 The game was made available to

Tempe, Arizona elementary school students. Parental consent was not
required to play the game and students were allowed to play it
without teacher supervision. The parents of an eleven-year old Black

student, who was humiliated by White classmates while playing the
game, filed a civil rights law suit against the school district.2" In a
second incident in Greenwich, Connecticut, five White high school
seniors printed a coded message "Kill All Niggers," which appeared in
their school yearbook. 2
The students, who were barred from
graduation, denied any malicious intent 2 2
Some might dismiss these incidents as innocent, unintentional
slights at best and isolated, rare incidents at worst. Others may
conclude that Blacks are hypersensitive, paranoid, and looking for
racism in all the wrong places. This conclusion might be tenable if
microaggressions and macroaggressions were the only evidence of
racial harm. They exist, however, alongside undeniable racial
discrimination. Empirical data attest to the existence of racial
discrimination in a number of arenas, including commercial
lending,23 employment,24 and policing in minority communities.

17. Id. at 1568.
18. See generally Katheryn ILRussell, The RacialHoax: TheLaw as Affirmation, 71 IND. LJ.593
(1996) (discussing macroaggressions).
19. School's Computer Game on Slavery Prompts Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at A4, A10.
20. Id.
21. Jacques Steinberg, Racist Message Reveals Town's Rift, N.Y. TiMmJune 21, 1995, at B4.
On a personal note, in September 1995, I attended a meeting at the Department ofJustice's
Federal Bureau of Prisons office. During a break, two of us searched out the ladies room and
were led out into the stairwellto a door which read "Women." We looked at one another, puzzled
as to why the restroom was in the stairwell. The person directing us stated that the bathrooms
were built duringJim Crow for Black workers, who were not permitted to use the rest rooms on
the main floor.
22. Id.
23. See Peg Brickley, Loan-DenialRates Could Draw Scrutiny ofJustice Department, ROCHESTER
Bus. J., June 23, 1995, at 1 (reporting discrepancy in rate of loans approved for Blacks and
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The failure of some Whites to see the harm Blacks experience
(White denial) by microaggressions, macroaggressions, and discrimination is rooted in the two groups' distinct racial realities." On one
side, Blacks exist in a world with microaggressions, macroaggressions,
and overt racial discrimination. On the other side, Whites inhabit a
relatively colorless world and are hard pressed to "see" Black racial
reality. These vastly different realities may shed some light upon the
divergence of opinion on the necessity and viability of affirmative
action. Whites understandably take offense to complaints about racial
abuses that they do not participate in, do not experience as part of
daily life, and do not see others experience. This reality makes it
easier for Whites to excuse racial abuses as random and fleeting.
Further, it allows them to deny harm and concomitant responsibility.
By contrast, Blacks understandably take offense to White attempts to
neutralize or dismiss racial harms. The fact that Whites as a group
are unaware of the daily racial tolls that Blacks pay, does not negate
the harm. Not surprisingly, this divergence in life experiences places
us at a crossroads on what to do about affirmative action.

II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ITS RED HERRINGS
Two of the symposium panelists, Richard Kahlenberg and Mark
Hager, expressed support for abolishing affirmative action "as we
know it" and adopting class-based affirmative action in its place.
Underlying this proposition are several assumptions that raise
numerous questions. First, a class-based analysis suggests that class is

Whites at some of nations largest banks); Steven A. Holmes, Lawsuit Sees Bias Where Nations Bank
Sees None, N.Y. TIMES,June 11, 1995, at D1 (stating that Nations Bank rejected 17.5% of its Black
mortgage applicants compared with 3.3% of its White mortgage applicants); Michael Porter, The
Rise ofthe UrbanEntrepreneur,INC., May 16, 1995, at 104, 104 (postulating that states must attempt
to revitalize inner cities to put minorities on equal footing).
24.

See Evansville Hospital Worker Claims Racism, COURIERJ. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 9, 1995,

at A7 (reporting that Black hospital employee accused superintendent of not stopping racial
slurs against him by other employees and by patients' families);Jane Stancill, Town Owes Wor*ers
Back Pay, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 6, 1995, at B5 (discussing lawsuits filed by
38 department workers claiming racial discrimination).
25. See Don Terry, PhiladelphiaShaken by CriminalPolice Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995,
at AS (describing behavior of five police officers who spent years "beating, robbing, lying and
planting phoney evidence" in poor black neighborhoods).
26. This experimental gap is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the mirror opposite
opinions expressed by Blacks and Whites regarding the OJ. Simpson verdict. For example, The
Washington Pos4 October 4, 1995, published 26 articles on the verdict reflecting the polarity of
opinions along racial lines. See, eg.,Joel Achenbach, UnanimousDecision Leaves Nation Divided,

WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at A27; Richard Cohen, America's RacialDivide WASH. POST, Oct. 4,
1995, at A25; Paul Duggan, Washington Comes To a Stop; Then Pent-Up Emotions Start Spilling Out
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al; Howard Kurtz, HungJuly in the Court of Public Opinion,WASH.

PosT, Oct. 4, 1995 at B1; Tom Shales, A TV Nation, Together and Divided, WASH. POST, Oct. 4,
1995, at B1.
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a more appropriate basis for affirmative action than race. To
effectively argue that class should trump race as a criterion for
affirmative action, minimally requires proof that being low income is
a greater obstacle to overcome than being a minority. One panelist
offered the hypothetical case of a middle class Black student and a
poor White student, with similar academic credentials, who apply to
an educational institution. He argued that admission should be
granted to the White student from an economically disadvantaged
background. This argument assumes that it would be easier for the
Black student to "transcend" her race than it would be for the White
student to "transcend" her economic standing. This proposition begs
for empirical support. The middle class Black student versus the poor
White student, sets up a false dichotomy. The class over race
resolution assumes that there is a greater need to integrate poor
Whites into the professional work force than middle income Blacks.
Given that Blacks are disproportionately low income, this assumption
is questionable. More importantly, for centuries Blacks were denied
admission to institutions because of their Blackness, without regard to
their financial means.
Second, the argument for class-based affirmative action treats
income and wealth as one and the same. The more appropriate
comparison would be to examine the ratio between Black and White
wealth. 7 The data on wealth shows a tremendous gap between
Black and White net worth, which includes property ownership and
financial assets.2" Wealth also includes what economists call "human
capital."29 This is the ability to afford certain middle-class amenities,
like travel, private schools, and cultural exposure. Determining the
wealth ratio, therefore, would be critical to an assessment of economic
hardship as a basis for affirmative action. Insofar as wealth impacts
the probability of completing school, this Black-White disparity may
affect matriculation.
Third, the proposal for class-based affirmative action dichotomizes
complex issues. Race and class do not exist in isolation, rather they
intersect. Further, there are more than two racial groups. Using the
college admissions hypothetical, how would a class-based scheme treat

27. See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/wHITE WEALTH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995).
28. For example, it is estimated that the median Black middle-class family has $34,380
compared with $77,782 for the median White middle income family. Id. at 197.
29. University of Chicago economist Gary Becker defines human capital as encompassing
capital which "yield[s] income and other useful outputs over long periods of time." GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 15 (1993). This includes education and access to Medical care. Id.
at 15-16.
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an Asian from a lower class family competing against a Black from a
middle-class family?" ° What about a middle-class Asian competing
against a lower class Black student? In support of class-based
affirmative -action, Kahlenberg commented that Blacks and other
minorities would benefit disproportionately because they are
disproportionately poor. While this is true, such an analysis denies
the reality of the role race plays in American life. Specifically, it
summarily rejects White skin privilege and Black skin underprivilege.
Even in a class-based affirmative action scheme, the question of race
resurfaces. What if a university admissions office were faced with
applications, from a middle-class White student and a middle-class
Black student who have similar test scores and grades? Does this
mean that race can no longer be used as a consideration? Can we
assume that the two students, one White, one Black, have overcome
similar odds, and are now equal? This sounds farcical. Also, it denies
the present American racial reality for Blacks-replete with
microaggressions, macroaggressions, overt discrimination, and White
denial.
The suggestion that class should replace race as a basis for
affirmative action is an appealing solution for the wrong reasons. It
seems clear that there are many types of hardship, which are worthy
of affirmative action, one of them being poverty. The apparent
impetus for class-based affirmative action, however, is to assuage the
fears of the "angry, White male." One of the panelists suggested that
class-based affirmative action is politically palatable, whereas racebased is not. This argument appears shortsighted. There are more
poor people than there are middle-class people. Are the latter really
willing to give up their privilege to the former?
A class-based
paradigm simply shifts the critique of affirmative action from race
versus merit to class versus merit. This would create another group
of dissenters-angry, privileged Whites. Further, to paraphrase a
question posed by Robert Chang, Professor, "What will be done about
the angry minority?" Is not this proposed scheme a rejection of the
political worth of minorities? Finally, even if we redefine affirmative
action schemes to place class at the center, we still cannot avoid the
issue of race.
So, the "solution" of implementing class-based
affirmative action is really no solution at all. It would only forestall,
temporarily, the question of what to do about race.

30. See generally Robert S.Chang, The End of Innocence or Politics After the Fall of the Essential
Subject, 45 AM. U. L.REV. 687 (1996) (discussing racial identity as process).
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Thus, the above discussion offers a cursory critique of the argument
for class-based affirmative action. In sum, shifting the basis of
qualification toward class and away from race can only offer shortterm success, if any. Until we as a society address the problem of
racial discrimination-in its many incarnations-against Blacks in
particular and minorities in general, any legislative or judicial
solutions offered will be unsatisfactory. Until we deal with these issues
front and center, we can expect nothing more from the United States
Supreme Court than a "mess of pottage.""

31. James Weldon Johnson, The Autobiography of An Ex-Clored Man, in THREE NEGRO
CLASsIcS 511 (John H. Franklin ed., 1965) (using phrase to describe racial predicament of Black
man who is passing for White).

